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I. INTRODUCTION

This article surveys opinions in maritime cases decided by the United
States Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, and state and federal courts in Florida. This survey covers the
period from July 1996 through July 1997.
II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

A.

Seaman Status

A frequently asked question, one that is not often addressed consistently
by the lower courts, is whether a maritime employee, who is a Jones Act
seaman,' is entitled to an action against his or her employer/shipowners. In
Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai,2 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
provide clarification and to resolve the conflict existing in the courts of appeal
with regard to the application of the test to determine seamen status
which was
4
3
set forth in Chandris,Inc. v. Latsis to determine seamen status.
In HarborTug, a maritime worker was injured while painting the housing
structure of a docked tug, a one-day job that he had obtained through a union
hiring hall.'
The worker brought suit against the tug owner claiming
negligence under the Jones Act and unseaworthiness based upon general
maritime law. The district court denied seaman status in reliance on a test, that
has been since superseded, holding that the "' [plaintiff] did not have a 'more or
less permanent connection' with the vessel on which he was injured nor did he

1. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (1994).

2. 117 S.Ct. 1535 (1997).
3. 515 U.S. 347 (1995).
4. HarborTug, 117 S.Ct. at 1538.
5. Id. at 1537.
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perform substantial work on the vessel sufficient for seaman status."' 6 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and in reliance on Chandris,held that
the relevant inquiry was "'not whether plaintiff had a permanent connection
with the vessel [but] whether plaintiffs relationship with a vessel (or a group
of vessels) was substantial in terms of duration and nature."' 7 The majority
reasoned that if the type of work performed would customarily entitle a
maritime worker to seaman status if performed for a single employer, "the
worker should not be deprived of that status simply because the industry
operates under a daily assignment rather than a permanent employment
system."'
The Supreme Court reiterated the test set forth in Chandris for
determining seaman status under the Jones Ac? as follows: First, "'an
employee's duties must contributfe] to the function of the vessel or to the
accomplishment of its mission,"
and second, an employee "must have a
connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such
11
vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature."
Applying the test to the facts of this case, the Court ruled that although the
plaintiffs performance on board the vessel contributed to its function or
purpose, the plaintiff failed to establish a substantial connection to the vessel
or to an identifiable group of vessels.12 The Court held that the fact that the
plaintiff had done similar maritime work on other vessels not owned by the
defendant, did not satisfy the substantial connection test.13 Rather, the vessels
must be "subject to common ownership or control.' 41 Further, the Court ruled
that the focus of the substantial connection requirement is "whether the
employee's duties take him to sea," which the plaintiffs job did not.15 In this
case, the Supreme Court sufficiently narrowed the instances in which a worker
can establish seaman status under the Jones Act. 16 This is an important
decision for employers/shipowners.

6. Id. at 1539 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a).
7. Id. (quoting Papai v. Harbor Tug & Barge Co., 67 F.3d 203, 206 (9th Cir. 1995)).
8. Id.
9. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (1994).
10. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 368 (1995) (citation omitted).
11. Harbor Tug, 117 S. Ct. at 1540 (citing Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 368
(1995)).
12. Id.
13. Id at 1542.
14. Id. at 1541.
15. Id. at 1540.
16. Harbor Tug, 117 S. Ct. at 1543.
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ProductsLiability

According to United States Supreme Court precedent, 17 "an admiralty tort
plaintiff cannot recover for the physical damage a defective product causes to
the 'product itself,'
but can recover for physical damage the product causes to
'other property.' ' 18 In Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M Martinac & Co., 19 the
Court was asked to determine whether equipment added to a product by the
initial owner/user prior to the sale of the product to a subsequent owner/user is
considered part of the "product itself' or "other property. '20 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that the added equipment was part of the "product
itself' since when sold to the subsequent owner/user "the added equipment
was part of the defective product.",21 Thus, the court held that the subsequent
owner/user was not entitled to recover in tort for damage to the added
equipment, but rather was limited to principles of warranty and contract law.22
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.2 3
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, holding
that items added to a product by the initial user are not part of the "product
itself' but are "other property," and the character of the product as sold to the
initial user is not changed by the initial user's sale of the product. 24 The Court
reasoned that had the product "remained in the hands of the [i]nitial [u]ser,"
the loss of the added equipment could have been recovered in tort.25 To allow
a different rule with the subsequent sale of the product would compromise the
incentive of the law of products liability, which is to encourage the
manufacture of safer products.

17.
18.
omitted).
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 117 S. Ct. 1783, 1784 (1997) (citation

Id.at 1783.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Saratoga, 117 S.Ct. at 1786.
Id. at 1789.
Id. at 1788.
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IMI. OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

A.

Limitation of LiabilityAct

The Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act,26 ("The Limitation
Act"), allows a vessel owner to bring suit in a court of admiralty to limit its
"liability for any damages arising from a maritime accident to the value of the
vessel and its freight, provided that the accident occurred without the owner's
'privity or knowledge.' 2 7
In Suzuki of Orange Park, Inc. v. Schubert,28 the plaintiff brought suit
against a corporate vessel owner for personal injury sustained when he was
thrown from a recreational watercraft operated by the vessel owner's
29
employee.
The vessel owner filed an action under The Limitation Act to
limit its liability. Plaintiff argued that since the operator of the vessel was the
corporation's president his actions were attributable to the corporation;
therefore, the vessel owner could not prove absence of privity or knowledge.
Plaintiff argued that under the circumstances, his actions should not be limited
to the admiralty court, which sits without a jury, but should be allowed to
proceed in state court. The district court agreed and
denied the vessel owner's
31
30
limitation petition. The vessel owner appealed.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court that it would
be impossible for the corporate vessel owner to prove lack of privity or
knowledge based on its president's actions. 32 However, based upon the facts of
the case, the court found that it was possible that the corporate owner could
also be vicariously liable for the acts of others even though it lacked privity or
knowledge. 33 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that the vessel owner should not
be denied his limitation action. 34 Accordingly, the district court's decision
35 was
reversed, and the case was remanded for fashioning of the proper relief.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

46 U.S.C. app. §§ 181-196 (1994).
Suzuki of Orange Park, Inc. v. Schubert, 86 F.3d 1060, 1062 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1060.
Id. at 1062.
Id. at 1061.
Id.
Suzuki of OrangePark,86 F.3d at 1065-66.
Id. at 1066.
Id.
Id. at 1066-67.
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Jurisdiction

In Ambassador Factors v. Rhein-, Maas-, Und See- Schiffahrtskontor
GMBH (VORMALS SANARA REEDEREIKONTOR GMBI),36 the Eleventh
Circuit had little difficulty determining that a maritime contract assigned to
another may be enforced by an assignee in admiralty.37 The court, relying on
Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent, reasoned that "the nature of
the disputed contract, not the status or alignment of parties, is the crucial
inquiry in determining whether a contract is in admiralty. 38 Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit held that as long as the assignment is valid, the assigned
contract pertains directly to it, and is "'necessary for commerce or navigation
upon navigable waters,"' 39 the assignee may enforce the assigned
contract.40 This rule applies even if the assignment contract itself is not within
the federal court's admiralty jurisdiction. 41

In Hutchins v. Tennessee Valley Authority,42 the plaintiff brought a
wrongful death action under the Jones Act against the Tennessee Valley
Authority ("TVA") for the drowning death of her husband, a deckhand at a
TVA plant in Alabama. 3 The district court dismissed the action, holding that
it was barred by the exclusivity provision of the Federal Employees
Compensation Act ("FECA"), 44 which provides that the exclusive remedy is
against the United States with respect to the injury or death of an
employee. 45 The plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal order and
urged the court to find, contrary to existing precedent, that a plain reading of
FECA and the Jones Act mandates that federally employed seamen are not
bound by FECA and may bring suit against the TVA under the Jones Act.46
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's
claim, holding that it was compelled to follow prior case law which limits a
federally employed seaman to the exclusive remedy of FECA.47 Although the
Eleventh Circuit was apparently not persuaded by the plaintiff's argument that

36. 105 F.3d 1397 (1lth Cir. 1997).
37. Id. at 1400.
38. Id. at 1398.
39. Id. at 1399 (quoting Nehring v. Steamship M/V Point Vail, 901 F.2d 1044, 1048
(I
lth Cir. 1990)).
40. Id. at 1400.
41. AmbassadorFactors, 105 F.3d at 1400.
42. 98 F.3d 602 (11th Cir. 1996).
43. Id. at 602-03.
44. 5 U.S.C. § 8116 (1994).
45. Hutchins, 98 F.3d at 603 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (1994)).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 603-04.
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the court should overturn existing precedent, the court contended that
48 even if it
were so inclined, such a decision would require an en banc decision.
In Alderman v. Pacific Northern Victor, Inc.,49 the plaintiff slipped and
fell on an oil drilling vessel that was being converted into a fish processing
vessel.50 At the time of the accident, the vessel was docked on navigable
waters in Florida. More than three years after the accident, the plaintiff filed
suit for personal inury under Florida law against the vessel's interests in
Florida state court. Due to the defending vessel's interests, the case was
removed to federal court based on diversity and admiralty jurisdiction. 2 The
defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiff's action
was within admiralty jurisdiction33 and was therefore, untimely under the three
year limitations period for maritime torts.54 The District Court for the Northern
District of Florida granted the motion, and the plaintiff appealed.55
On appeal, the parties agreed that if the tort were governed by maritime
law, instead of Florida law, the plaintiff's action would have been deemed
untimely.5 6 In determining the choice of law problem, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's decision in
GrubartInc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. 57 The Eleventh Circuit held
that according to Grubart,the test for determining whether a tort action falls
within admiralty jurisdiction requires satisfaction of the following requisites:
First, the tort must occur on navigable waters, or the injury suffered on land
must have been caused by a vessel on navigable waters; and second, the claim
needs to have a sufficient connection with traditional maritime activity. 8 In
determining the second prong of the test, the court must consider "whether the
incident has a 'potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce,"' and
"whether the 'general character' of the 'activity giving rise to the
59 incident'
shows a 'substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity."'
Plaintiff argued that although the incident occurred on navigable waters,
the claim did not fall within admiralty jurisdiction because the incident did not

48. Id. at 603.
49. 95 F.3d 1061 (11th Cir. 1996).
50. Id at 1063.
51. Id
52. Id.

53. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 763(a) (1994).
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Alderman, 95 F.3d at 1063.
Id.
Id.
513 U.S. 527 (1995).
Alderman, 95 F.3d at 1063-64.

59. Id. at 1064 (citations omitted).
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cause any actual impact on maritime commerce. Further, it did not bear z
substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. 6' In addressing the
plaintiffs first contention, that his accident caused no actual impact on
maritime commerce, the court held that the "focus is not on what actually
happened, but upon the potential effects of what could happen." 62 The
Eleventh Circuit concluded that "[u]nsafe working conditions aboard a vessel
under repairs, maintenance, or conversion.., pose a potentially disruptive
impact upon maritime commerce. 63
With respect to the plaintiffs second contention, namely, that the activity
giving rise to the incident bears no substantial relationship to traditional
maritime activity, the court ruled that the focus is not on the plaintiff's
64
characterization of his job description as a land based "construction worker."
Rather, the focus is on the activity of the vessel's interests as putative
65
Since the vessel's interests of converting, repairing, or
tortfeasors.
maintaining a vessel in navigable waters is substantially related to traditional
66
maritime activity, the court held that substantive admiralty law applied.
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit held that the three year statute of limitation
67
for personal injury actions brought in admiralty barred the plaintiff's claims.
68
In Isbrandtsen Marine Services, Inc. v. M/V INAGUA TANL4, seamen
employed aboard a vessel attempted to intervene as claimants against the
vessel on the date of its sale.69 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida rejected the intervening seamen's application on
the grounds that it was not in compliance with the local rules governing such
requests. 70 After the sale of the vessel, the seamen filed a motion to set aside
the sale, "and for emergency interim relief allowing it to file" a claim against
the vessel "as priority creditors." 71 The seamen argued that they had not
received proper notice of the sale; nonetheless, the court denied their
application as untimely, and/or that the remedy requested at such a late date
,,72
7
"would not be equitable to the interest of all parties. The seamen appealed.73

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Alderman, 95 F.3d at 1064.
Id. at 1065.
Id.
Id. at 1065-66.
Id. at 1066.
93 F.3d 728 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 730.
Id. at 731.
Id. at 732.
Id.
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On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the intervening seamens' claim was
invalid since the vessel had already been sold. The Eleventh Circuit agreed
with the plaintiff that an "in rem proceeding clears a vessel of all maritime
liens and that the purchaser gained good title against the world. 74 However,
the court reasoned that "since the proceeds of the sale remain[ed] in the
[c]ourt's registry in "lieu of the res," the court retained jurisdiction.75 Having
jumped the initial hurdle of jurisdiction,
the court then analyzed whether the
76
seamen were entitled to intervene.
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court that the seamen's
' 77
action was untimely, and thus "they had no automatic right to intervene.
However, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that the local rules permit district
court discretion in allowing a seaman's late claim "'under such conditions and
terms as are equitable."' 78 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that since seamen
are "wards of admiralty whose rights federal courts are duty-bound to jealously
protect," the district court abused its discretion in failing to aid the crew, by not
allowing them to correct deficiencies in their motion to intervene and their
complaint. 7 9 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded the case to the
district court "with instructions that
80 the crew be permitted to amend their
complaint and motion to intervene."
C.

SettlingMulti-PartyMaritime Actions

In 1994, the United States Supreme Court decided McDermott, Inc. v.
AmClyde8 1 and Boca Grande Club, Inc. v. FloridaPower & Light Co., 2 two
decisions having a significant impact upon settlements made in multiparty
maritime actions. In McDermott, the Court adopted the proportionate share
approach for settling multiparty maritime actions, which reduces the award
against a nonsettling tortfeasor by the percentage of fault assigned to a settling
3
joint
tortfeasor.8
Boca Grande,
the Court held
that the adoption
of the
proportionate
shareIn approach
in McDermott
extinguished
an action
for

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
E(2)(b)).
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Isbrandtsen,93 F.3d at 732.
Id.
Id. at 733.
Id.
Id.
Isbrandtsen, 93 F.3d at 733 (quoting S.D. FLA. ADMmALTY AND MARtrrm R.
Id. at 733-34.
Id. at 735.
511 U.S. 202 (1994).
511 U.S. 222 (1994).
McDermott, 511 U.S. at 204.
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contribution against a settling defendant.8 4 Based on the decisions in
McDermott and Boca Grande, the district court in Great Lakes Dredge &
Dock Co. v. Tanker Robert Watt Miller, 5 dismissed contribution claims
brought by a nonsettling party against another settling party. 86 The nonsettling
party appealed, arguing that even if its general contribution claims87 were
precluded, its claims for maintenance and cure expenses should survive.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district court's
conclusion that the nonsettling party's general contribution claims were
precluded by McDermott and Boca Grande.88 However, it disagreed with the
and Boca Grande required the same
district court's conclusion
•
• that McDermott•89
result with respect to claims based on maintenance and cure. The Eleventh
Circuit found that, unlike a nonsettling joint tortfeasor, a shipowner is
obligated to provide maintenance and cure regardless of fault; therefore, the
proportionate share approach will never benefit the shipowner.90 The only
means by which maintenance and cure expenses can be apportioned among all
tortfeasors responsible for harm to seamen is to allow claims for contribution. 91
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that McDermott and Boca Grande leave
binding precedent intact with respect to maintenance and cure expenses, and
that the settling party should be allowed
92 to proceed against the nonsettling
party for contribution for such expenses.
D. Immunity
In Kasprik v. United States,93 a case of first impression, the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether the Suits in Admiralty Act
("SAA") 94 bars an injured seaman employed aboard a United States owned
vessel from bringing an action against the operator of the vessel, an agent for
the United States, for punitive damages for the arbitrary and willful denial of
maintenance and cure.95 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the
district court that pursuant to the SAA, a seaman employed aboard a United

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Boca Grande, 511 U.S. at 223.
92 F.3d 1102 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1103.
Id.at I105.
Id. at 1106.
Id.
Great Lakes, 92 F.3d at 1107.
Id.
Id.
87 F.3d 462 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
46 U.S.C. app. § 745 (1994).
Kasprik, 87 F.3d at 464.
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States vessel is barred from bringing suit "by reason of the same subject matter
against an agent or employee of the United States." 96 Although the Eleventh
Circuit believed that precedent allowed an action for punitive damages against
the United States, the Eleventh Circuit failed to extend the seaman's
entitlement against an agent of the United States. Instead, the court opined
that the exclusivity provision of the SAA effectively abolished such a claim.98
IV. DECISIONS BY THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS IN FLORIDA
A.

Maritime Liens

In Villafores v. Royal Venture Cruise Lines, Ltd.,99 the defendant entered
into extended negotiations for the purchase of a vessel, at which time the
owner of the vessel agreed that the defendant could begin repairs and
refurbishing to the vessel prior to its purchase.100 As security, the defendant
had the plaintiff post an irrevocable letter of credit to the owner of the vessel
on its behalf, so that any debts incurred due to repairs and other work, would
be paid and would not become maritime liens. When the sale transaction did
not close, the owner of the vessel had to draw down on the full amount of the
letter of credit to pay the debts incurred by the defendant for work performed
on the vessel. The plaintiff filed a claim for a maritime lien against the vessel
on the grounds that the vessel owner's drawing down of the letter of credit was
an advance of funds to pay off necessaries.
Although it is generally recognized that a person advancing funds for the
purpose of acquiring "necessaries" has a maritime lien against the vessel, the
court found that under the facts presented that was not the case.102 Rather, the
repairs had already been performed on the vessel when the letter of credit was
drawn down.10 3 Further, the court recognized that the Federal Maritime Lien
Act10 4 defines "necessaries" as "'the things that a prudent owner would
provide to enable a ship to perform well the functions for which she has been
engaged." ' 10 5 Since the repairs were performed by the defendant, a non-owner,
96. Id. at 465 (citing 46 U.S.C. app. § 745 (1994)).
97. Id. at 466.

98. Id.
99. 10 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D631 (M.D. Mar. 31, 1997).

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. atD631.
Id.
Id.
Id.
46 U.S.C. § 31301 (1994).

105. Villaflores, 10 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. at D631 (quoting Espirito Santo Bank of Fla v.
MV Tropicana, 1992 AMC 1672 (S.D. Fla. May 29, 1990)).
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for sale of the vessel, the repairs did not constitute
and were not 10necessary
"necessaries."' 6
In conclusion, the court held that the letter of credit was not to provide
repairs to the vessel, but was to provide security in order to facilitate the sale
08
not maritime in nature.1
of the vessel.10 7 Contracts for sale of a vessel10 are
9
Therefore, the court did not have jurisdiction.
B.

Rule B Attachment

Rule B(1) of the Supplemental Rules for CertainAdmiralty andMaritime
Claims "provides a vehicle for serving process and obtaining 'quasi in rem'
jurisdiction over a defendant" that cannot be found in the district by attaching
the defendant's "goods and chattels, or credits and effects in the hands of
gamishees."" 0 In the case of Oceanfocus Shipping Ltd. v. NavieraHumboldt,
S.A.,"' the plaintiff utilized this rule to attach a secured letter of credit and
assets pledged by third parties as security for the letter of credit maintained at 2a
local bank on behalf of the defendant, a party not found within the district.'
The defendant moved to quash service of process and dismiss the complaint
for lack of quasi in rem jurisdiction on the grounds that a line of credit "is not
a good, chattel, credit or effect of the [d]efendant within the meaning of the
Rule."'13

The court observed that "many [other] courts have recognized that funds
available to a defendant under a letter of credit issued by a third party are not
subject to attachment as property of the defendant."' " 4 The court, agreeing with
this rationale, determined that the funds available under a "line of credit" did
not belong to the defendant, but were "essentially loan proceeds that eventually
must be repaid."' " 5 The court reasoned that a line of credit "is nothing more
than a privilege to incur a debt; and... cannot be considered a 'good, chattel,

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Oceanfocus Shipping Ltd. v. Naviera Humboldt, S.A., 962 F. Supp. 1481, 1483
(S.D. Fla. 1996) (citing SuPP. R. FOR CERTAIN ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME CLAIMS OF FED. R.
Civ. P. B(1)).
11. Id. at 1481.
112. Id. at 1483.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1484. See, e.g., Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. World Energy Sys. Assoc., 816
F.2d 1092 (6th Cir. 1987); Diakan Love, S.A. v. Al-Haddad Bros. Enter., Inc., 584 F. Supp.
782, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
115. Oceanfocus, 962 F. Supp. at 1485.
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credit or effect' within the meaning of Rule B."' 6 Further, the court found
that the relationship between the defendant and the assets pledged in support of
the line of credit were too attenuated and were intended to protect the bank, not
the defendant's creditors.1 7 Based on the aforementioned, the court granted
to quash and dismissed the action for lack of
defendant's motion
s
jurisdiction'I
C.

In Rem Claims

In admiralty, it is not uncommon for a plaintiff to sue a vessel in rem, as
the offending object pursuant to the SupplementalRules for CertainAdmiralty
and Maritime Claims.n 9 The suit is brought in the district in which the vessel
is located under admiralty jurisdiction.r 20 However, in Shaffer v. Tiffany
Yachts, Inc.,121 "in a novel attempt to establish in rem jurisdiction," an action
was brought on behalf of the vessel against the defendant for breach of
contract.1 The court refused to apply in rem jurisdiction on the grounds that
an admiralty proceeding in rem is one brought against a vessel, not by a
jurisdiction
vessel.123 The court held that in order for the vessel to establish
124
over the defendant it must establish in personamjurisdiction.
D. Maritime Contracts
There is a constant battle in cases involving admiralty and maritime
matters with respect to what law should apply. Clearly, if there is an
established rule in admiralty, it should apply irrespective of a contrary state
law. However, often times the query is whether there actually exists a rule in
admiralty and whether it is clearly established. The United States District
issue in
Court for the Southern District of Florida was confronted with this
125
ABB Power T & D Co., Inc. v. Gothaer VersicherungsbankVVAG.
In ABB Power, pursuant to a sales contract a seller agreed to deliver a
transformer to the buyer.126 The seller then contracted with another for the
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1488.
118. Id.

119. SunP. R. FOR CERTAIN ADMIRALTY
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

AND MARITIME CLAIMS OF FED. R. Civ. P.

B(1).

Id.
No. 96-1463, 1996 WL 870734, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 1996).
Id. at*1.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id at *2.
939 F. Supp. 1568 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
Id at 1569.
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manufacture and delivery of the transformer to the buyer. During transport, the
transformer was destroyed. Although the seller obtained marine insurance to
cover the transformer during transport, the insurer refused coverage on the
grounds that neither the seller nor the manufacturer possessed insurable
interests and thus lacked standing to bring suit against the insurer. The court
denied the insurer's motion for summary judgment; and the insurer moved to
have the court reconsider its decision arguing, among other things, that the
court erroneously failed to follow Fifth Circuit precedent. 127 In support of its
motion to reconsider, the insurer made the same arguments, produced the same
cases, and128raised the same discussions as in its earlier motion for summary
judgment.
The court, as a preliminary matter, admonished the insurer for improper
use of the rules of procedure. 129 The court held that a motion to reconsider
"'should not be used as a vehicle to present authorities available at the time of
the first decision or to reiterateargumentspreviously made' ... [or] to ask the
Court to rethink what [it] ...already thought through.' 130 Rather, its purpose
is to share newly discovered evidence or to clarify an issue that the court may
have misunderstood. 131 Obviously offended by the insurer's suggestion that it
did not know its place in the judicial system with respect to following
precedent, the court explained that contrary to the insurer's belief, it had not
ignored or disregarded otherwise binding and valid precedent. 132 Further, the
court found that there was binding precedent more directly on point than that
133
cited by the insurer, which required the court to reject the insurer's position.
The court determined that United States Supreme Court precedent
requires that firmly entrenched rules of admiralty law, governing the
interpretation of marine insurance contracts, "reign[] supreme over contrary
state law provisions." 134 Applying the most recent and binding panel's test for
determining whether admiralty or state law applies, the court found that the
issue of whether certain parties are insurable interests under a marine contract
is a firmly entrenched principle of federal admiralty law. l35 Finding that
entrenched federal admiralty law defines an "insurable interest" as "any

127.
128.
129.
1992)).
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
(1955)).
135.

Id. at 1571.
Id. at 1572.
Id. (citing Z.K. Marine, Inc. v. MN Archigetis, 808 F. Supp. 1561, 1563 (S.D. Fla.
ABB Power, 939 F. Supp. at 1572 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1574.
Id. at 1575.
Id. (citing Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 312
ABB Power, 939 F. Supp. at 1580.
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pecuniary interest," the court affirmed its earlier decision denying the insurer's
motion for summaryjudgment and held that contrary
to the insured's assertion,
136
conflicting state law was effectively preempted.
E.

Maintenance andCure

In Aksoy v. Apollo Ship Chandlers, Inc.,"' the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida, in response to a class action,
addressed the issue of whether a crewmember's unearned sick wages should
include tips. 138 The issue arose when the plaintiff commenced a class action
against the defendants seeking "reasonably anticipated tips or, alternatively,
monthly guaranteed tips as part of' the maintenance and cure owed to crew
members who became ill or injured. 139 The defendants moved for summary
judgment on the basis that the plaintiff had been paid his guaranteed minimum
tips as part of his unearned sick wages, and therefore he had no standing. The
plaintiff retorted that he was owed his actual anticipated wages, an amount
exceeding the guaranteed amount. Relying on Flores v. Carnival Cruise
Lines, 40 the plaintiff argued that precedent required the court to calculate tips
by determining
141 the amount of tips plaintiff would have earned had he remained
on the ship.
The court disagreed and held that Flores was distinguishable from the
instant case in that in Flores there was no employment contract setting forth
the method of calculating tips.142 In this case, the plaintiff was guaranteed a
minimum amount of tips under the crew agreement. Since the defendants had
paid the plaintiff the guaranteed minimum amount as set forth in the crew
143
agreement, the court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
In Costa Crociere,S.p.A. v. Rose, 144 the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida was given another interesting issue for
determination with respect to maintenance and cure. 145 Specifically, the court
was asked to address whether a ship owner was obligated to continue paying

136. Id at 1581.
137. No. 94-632, 1996 WL 764115, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 1996).
138. Id. at *1.
139. Id.
140. 47 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir. 1995).
141. Aksoy, 1996 WL 764115, at *2.
142. Id

143. Idat *3.
144. 939 F.Supp. 1538 (S.D.Fla. 1996).
145. Id at 1539.
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maintenance
and cure to a seaman who had been diagnosed with an incurable
14 6
disease.
The case arose when a seaman on board the MV American Adventure
fell ill with IgA nephropathy, an incurable kidney disease that progressively
results in the eventual loss of kidney function. 147 The cause of this disease was
unknown. The seaman was evacuated from the ship, brought to a hospital, and
immediately placed on kidney dialysis, without which, absent a kidney
transplant, he would die. The shipowner, and the corporation which employed
the seaman, filed a complaint seeking a declaration that their obligation to
provide maintenance and cure to the seaman ended when the seaman became
stabilized on dialysis after being transferred from the ship to a hospital on
shore. The plaintiff argued that once the seaman became stabilized, he reached
the point of maximum medical improvement, and therefore, the plaintiff
had
148
no continuing obligation to provide him with maintenance and cure.
The court appeared to have no easy task in addressing this issue.
However, the court agreed with the plaintiff that a seaman's entitlement to
maintenance and cure continues to the point of maximum medical
improvement. 149 Additionally, the court recognized that the point at which a
seaman is determined to have reached
maximum medical improvement is a
150
question that is not easily answered.
After reviewing a number of opinions regarding the termination of
maintenance and cure benefits, the court determined that the main concern is
for the seaman's overall medical condition.'15
In determining whether a
seaman has reached maximum medical improvement, the pertinent test in the
Second Circuit is whether there is a possibility of a betterment in the seaman's
"condition.' ' 2 The court held that the term "condition" should be defined
15
broadly and not be limited to whether a disease has been deemed incurable. 3
The court based its decision on the fact that the admiralty courts have always
been liberal in interpreting the doctrine of maintenance and cure for the benefit
and the protection of seamen.1 54 Additionally, the court found that ambiguities
or doubts in the application
of the law of maintenance and cure are resolved in
55
favor of the seamen.1

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Id. at 1540.
Id. at 1548.
Costa Crociere,939 F. Supp. at 1549.
Id.
Id. at 1550.
Id. (citing Pelotto v. L&N Towing Co., 604 F.2d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 1979)).
Id.at 1550.
Costa Crociere,939 F. Supp. at 1558.
Id.
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The court held that the record makes it clear that treatment in the form of
dialysis or a transplant will unquestionably result in a betterment of the
seaman's condition. 5 6 The proposed treatment differs from other treatments
that merely treat pain and suffering without enhancing bodily function, in that
the proposed treatment represents the difference between life at a reasonable
level of functioning for an indefinite period of time and immediate death.
Accordingly, the court concluded that
5 7the seaman had not yet reached the point
of maximum medical improvement.
Having concluded that the duty of maintenance and cure continued as to
the subject seaman, a new issue then reared its ugly head; namely, whether the
shipowner/employer became obliged under the law of maintenance and cure to
provide the seaman with a kidney transplant in lieu of, or in addition to, kidney
dialysis.15 8 The plaintiff argued that statistically, a kidney transplant is
unlikely to be successful, it is costly, and it is unusual treatment beyond the
scope of maintenance and cure. Further, the plaintiff argued that even if the
transplant was successful, it would do no more than enhance the quality of the
seaman's life. 5 9
The court disagreed and held that the record indicated that the seaman has
a reasonable probability of survival with a transplant; a successful transplant
will better the seaman's condition to a greater extent than chronic dialysis; and,
although not determinative, a successful transplant, with time, ends up
considerably less expensive than chronic dialysis for three years. 16 The court
ruled that the probability of an improvement in the seaman's condition 1was
cure. 61
sufficient to bring treatment within the obligation of maintenance and
In conclusion, the court found that the obligation of maintenance and
cure is not finite, and there need not be a definite and absolute ending
point. 1 - The shipowner's obligation may continue for the life of the
As one can imagine, this case raises significant monetary
seaman.
concerns for the employers of seamen.
F.

Admiralty ContractJurisdiction

156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id. at 1559.
Id. at 1555.
Costa Crociere,939 F. Supp. at 1555.

160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id. at 1556.
Id.
Id. at 1557.
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In Terra Nova Insurance Co., v. Acer Latin America, Inc.,164 the
plaintiffs, foreign insurance underwriters, filed a complaint under the
Declaratory Judgment Act 165 seeking declaration of no coverage under 166a
marine cargo insurance policy issued to the defendant, a Florida corporation.
The defendant counterclaimed against the underwriters and their insurance
agent, also a Florida corporation, alleging diversity as the basis for jurisdiction.
The underwriters' insurance agent moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the
grounds that complete diversity was lacking since both it and the
counterclaimant were Florida corporations. The counterclaimant argued that
the court had supplemental jurisdiction' 67 over its compulsory counterclaim
and thus, the court
retained subject matter jurisdiction despite the nondiversity
68
of the parties.'
In the first instance, the court seemed to battle with whether to entertain
the action for declaratory relief.169 The court recognized that the decision of
whether to entertain an action for declaratory relief is within the discretion of
the court. 170 However, one of the factors for consideration in determining
whether to entertain such an action is whether the action is brought for the
purpose of "procedural fencing," a situation in which a party seeks declaratory
171
relief in order to accomplish something it could not do through removal.
In the instant case, the court found that had the defendant/counterclaimant
brought suit in the first instance, the presence of the nondiverse underwriters'
agent would have precluded removal absent admiralty jurisdiction. 172 Thus,
the court held that in order for the declaratory action to be proper, admiralty
jurisdiction must exist. 73 The plaintiffs argued that the policy at issue is a
maritime insurance contract, and, thus, is within the ambit of the court's
admiralty jurisdiction. 174 In response, the defendants argued that although the
policy was "captioned a 'marine cargo' policy[,] [i]t cover[ed] conveyances
'per land, water or air.' ' 175 Since the suit centered around theft of property on

164. 931 F. Supp. 852 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
165. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994).
166. Terra Nova, 931 F. Supp. at 854.
167. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994) (providing the basis for supplemental jurisdiction).
168. Terra Nova, 931 F. Supp. at 854.
169. Id. at 854-55.
170. Id. at 854. See Casualty Indem. Exch. v. High Croft Enter., Inc., 714 F. Supp.
1190, 1193 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
171. Terra Nova, 931 F. Supp. at 854.
172. Id.at 855.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 855-56.
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land, the plaintiffs argued that the policy should not be considered a maritime
contract.
The court considered both parties' arguments and determined that the
policy covered both maritime and nonmaritime obligations.177 Based on
existing law, the court held that in order for the policy to fall within admiralty
jurisdiction, the nonmaritime obligations had to be "'incidental' in an
otherwise maritime contract."'178 The court concluded that in this case, the
policy's nonmaritime elements were not "incidental" to the contract as a
whole. 7 9 The policy applied regardless of where the loss occurred, and in this
case, the loss occurred on land. 18 Thus, the court found that there was no
admiralty jurisdiction over the subject matter, and it dismissed the case without
prejudice to be filed in state court. 1
H. Duty of Shipper
In Narcissus Shipping Corp. v. Armada Reefers, Ltd,182 a bareboat
charterer brought suit against the time charterer and shipper/consignee to
recover damages it suffered as a result of a deviated voyage which resulted
from cargo shifting and the vessel taking on a severe list that could not be
corrected at sea. 18F The bareboat charterer alleged an action against the time
charterer for unpaid charter hire and breach of the duty to "load, trim, and
stow" the cargo as required by the charter party. 184 The bareboat charterer
alleged an action against the shipper/consignee for negligence in failing to
warn interested parties of prior shifting problems with respect to their product.
In response, the defendants filed counterclaims
against the bareboat charterer
185
and cross-claims against each other.
According to the facts of this case, the shipper/consignee contracted with
the time charterer for the shipment of juice products from Florida to the
Netherlands. Prior to contracting with the time charterer for the subject

176. TerraNova, 931 F. Supp. at 855.
177. Id. at 856.
178. Id. (quoting Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. v. Balfour Maclaine Int'l, 968 F.2d 196, 199

(2d Cir. 1992)).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 855-56.
181. TerraNova, 931 F. Supp. at 856.
182. 950 F. Supp. 1129 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
183. Id. at 1131. The court found that the shipper and consignee were closely related
companies that did not act without the consent of the other. Id. at 1132 n.1. Thus, for all
practical matters, the court considered them as one and the same. Id.
184. Id. at 1138.
185. Narcissus, 950 F. Supp. at 1139-41.
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voyage, the shipper/consignee, in an effort to reduce costs, experimented with
transporting its product in plastic containers break bulk, rather than in
refrigerated containers. The shipper/consignee attempted to utilize this method
on thirteen voyages, each resulting in a shifting of cargo and a dangerous
resulting list.
Despite the numerous problems encountered by the ship's
transportation of the shipper/consignee's product in this manner, and
recommendations made to the shipper/consignee for resolving these problems,
the shipper/consignee failed to advise the time charterer of the risk or to alter
its method of transporting its product.181
Before sailing, the shipper/consignee and its stevedore submitted a load
plan to the master of the vessel. After reviewing the load plan, the master
decided to erect side boards and to screw dunnage to the deck grating of the
vessel's holds to better secure the cargo. The master and his crew supervised
as the cargo was loaded. 188
Once at sea, the vessel began to roll port-side. Despite efforts to secure
the cargo, it shifted, causing the side boards to collapse and the vessel to
experience a severe list. As a result of the list, the master deviated from the
ship's intended route and sought refuge at a nearby port. Although the master
probably had good intentions, the port was not equipped to handle the
discharge, cold storage, and restow of18the
9 cargo. Consequently, the ship was
forced to return to its port of departure.
After hearing counsels' arguments and reviewing all the evidence of
record, the court concluded that the shipper/consignee was forty percent at
fault for failing to provide adequate securing materials, and for failing to warn
other parties of the numerous problematic voyages on which their cargo was
carried. 190 In finding that the remaining sixty percent was attributable to the
time charterer, the court focused on the master's decisions: To erect side
boards in order to restrain the drums (which had exacerbated the list when it
was destroyed); and to seek
refuge in a port ill-equipped to store the cargo
191
during the required restow.
With respect to actions between the bareboat charterer and the time
charterer the court found that the incident constituted an "'accident to her
cargo."' Pursuant to the charter party, "'any detention or expenses related to
the accident to cargo are for the account of the charterer,"' unless the accident

186. Id. at 1132-33.
187. Id. at 1133.
188. Id. at 1135-36. A stevedore is "[a] person employed in loading and unloading

vessels."
189.
190.
191.
192.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1414 (6th ed. 1990).

Narcissus,950 F. Supp. at 1136.
Id. at 1137.
Id.
Id.at 1138 (quoting clause 11(B) of the contract).
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is caused or contributed to by the negligence of the bareboat charterer. 193 The
court determined that the master's negligence, which contributed significantly
to the subject incident and to the unseaworthiness of the vessel, was
attributable to the bareboat charterer. 194 Thus, the court denied the
195 bareboat
charterer's action against the time charterer for unpaid charter hire.
However, the court found in favor of the bareboat charterer with respect
to its claim against the time charterer for breach of the charter party for failure
to "load, trim, and stow the cargo."' 196 The court determined that the master's
supervision of the loading, stowing, and discharging of the subject cargo did
97
not relieve the time charterer of financial responsibility for such actions.'
Therefore1 the court found the time charterer liable to the owner for breach of
contract. '
As to the bareboat charterer's claim against the shipper/consignee for
failure to warn the parties of the previous shifting problems, the court
concluded that since the propensities of the cargo were dangerous and not open
and obvious, the shipper/consignee did indeed owe a duty to inform the other
interested parties to the maritime venture. 199 The court concluded that the
shipper/consignee breached its duty to warn the other interested parties of its
prior problematic voyages, and, as such, the court held it liable to the other
parties of the venture.
As to the time charterer's counterclaim against the bareboat charterer for
the master's failure to adequately supervise the loading, stowing, and
discharging of cargo, the court concluded that the clause requiring the master
to supervise the loading, stowing, and discharging of cargo merely reiterated
what is always implicitly true, i.e., that the master retains the right "to
supervise any operations aboard the vessel to ensure that the same do not
adversely affect the seaworthiness of the vessel." 20 1 Since the time charterer
remained under a duty to the charter party with the responsibility to load, stow,
and discharge the cargo, the master had no viable counterclaim.
The court addressed the time charterer's and shipper/consignee's
counterclaims against the bareboat charterer for failure to exercise due

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id.
Narcissus,950 F. Supp. at 1138.
Id.
Id. 1138-39.
Id.
Id. at 1139.
Narcissus, 950 F. Supp. at 1139.
Id
Id. at 1140.
Id.
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diligence in providing a seaworthy vessel.2 °3 The court concluded that since
the duty of providing a seaworthy ship requires an owner to exercise due care,
not only in providing a seaworthy vessel, but also in ensuring the adequacy of
204
The court
the ship's equipment, the bareboat charter breached its duty.
determined that the problematic equipment was the ship's sideboards, which
the master installed to retain the cargo. 20 5 The vessel was deemed unseaworthy
because of its inadequate equipment.20 6 Therefore, the court concluded that
the bareboat charterer was liable to both the time charterer and the
shipper/consignee for unseaworthiness. 207
The time charterer and shipper/consignee cross-claimed against each
other for breach of the contract of affreightment. 2 08 The shipper/consignee
argued that the time charterer was liable for contribution/indemnity pursuant to
the contract provision which held that the time charterer was "'responsible
for.., delay in delivery of the goods only in case the.., delay has been
caused by the improper or negligent stowage of the goods.' 20 9 The court
disagreed, and held that the time charterer's agreement, pursuant to contract, to
bring cargo "'into the holds, loaded, stowed, and/or trimmed and taken from
the holds and discharged.., free of any risk, liability, and expense whatsoever
to the owners [time charterer],"' insulated time charterer from liability for
stowage problems. 21 As a result,2 1the court discarded the shipper/consignee's
cross-claim against time charterer.
Further, the court rejected time charterer's cross-claim against the
shipper/consignee for breach of the contract of affreightment for failure to
adequately pack the cargo.2 12 The court found no evidence indicating that the
cargo was inadequately packaged and held that the lack of damage to cargo
213
However, the district court did find value in the
supported the conclusion.
time charterer's cross-claim against the shipper/consignee for breach of its
duty, under the general maritime law, to warn the time charterer of the

203. Id.
204. Narcissus, 950 F. Supp. at 1140.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.at 1140-41.

208. Id. at 1141. A contract of affreightment is "a contract with a ship-owner to hire his
ship, or part of it, for the carriage of goods... [s]uch a contract generally takes the form either
of a charter-party or of a bill of lading." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 60 (6th ed. 1990) (citation

omitted).
209. Narcissus, 950 F. Supp. at 1142 (quoting clause 5(b) of the contract).
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.at 1142.
Id.
Id.
Id.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss1/2

22

O'Sullivan and Davis: Admiralty Law

1997]

O'Sullivan I Davis

potential dangerous nature of the drummed214cargo as evidenced by the
shipper/consignee's prior problematic voyages.
Additionally, the district court determined that "[u]nder the general
maritime law, cargo owners and shippers each have a duty to warn other
interested parties in the maritime venture of any inherent dangers in the cargo
of which they know or should know and which the others could not reasonably
be expected to know., 215 The shipper/consignee knew of the dangers
associated with the shipment of the drums which were not patently dangerous
and thereby breached its duty by failing to warn other parties.2 16 Therefore, the
district court ruled in favor of the time charterer's claim against the
shipper/consignee.217
V. FLORIDA DECISIONS
A.

Punitive Damages

In Langmead v. Admiral Cruises, Inc.,218 an entertainer employed by a
cruise ship injured herself while exercising in the ship's gym when an elastic
band she was using snapped and hit her in the eye.219 The entertainer sued the
cruise line for Jones Act negligence, unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure,
and punitive damages. The trial court directed a verdict for the cruise line on
the issues of maintenance and cure and punitive damages, but submitted the
22
0 At trial,
negligence and unseaworthiness claims' to a jury for determination.
" e
221
the jury denied the entertainer's claim for unseaworthiness..1 However, the
jury award for $50,000 on the claim for negligence was reduced to $5000 upon
The
finding that the entertainer was ninety percent comparatively negligent.
entertainer appealed the judgment.2 The Third District Court of Appeal of Florida affirmed the jury's verdict,
holding that the comparative negligence issue was properly submitted to the
jury.22 - However, it reversed and remanded the directed verdict, holding that

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Narcissus, 950 F. Supp. at 1142.
Id. at 1143.
Id
Id.
696 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id at 1190.
Id.
Id.
Id
Langmead, 696 So. 2d at 1190.
Id.
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the determination as to when the entertainer reached "'maximum medical
cure' should have been submitted to the jury.225
On remand, the trial court considered the following issues: 1) whether
certain visits made by the entertainer to a physician were "cure" and should
have been paid for; 2) whether the cruise line owed the entertainer two weeks
worth of lost wages; and 3) whether the cruise line's failure to pay the
entertainer warranted punitive damages. 226 The entertainer was denied her
maintenance claim on directed verdict, but was awarded cure for medical visits
that remained unpaid ($235), two weeks lost wages ($730), and punitive
damages ($3.5 million).
The trial court granted the cruise line's motion for a new trial, holding
that the "jury verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and
was influenced by prejudicial matters."22 8 The entertainer appealed, and the
third district appeared to have no difficulty in holding that the trial court
abused its discretion in granting the cruise line a new trial on the issue of
liability, and actual damages because the record fully supported the jury's
verdict.229 However, the third district
recognized that the more difficult issue
2 30
was the issue of punitive damages.
The cruise line argued that the punitive damage award was so excessive
that it violated the Substantive Due Process Clause of the United States and
Florida Constitutions. Citing the United States Supreme Court case, BMW of
North America v. Gore,23 1 the third district set forth three criteria for analysis
in determining the excessiveness of a punitive damage award: "1) the degree
of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct; 2) the ratio of the punitive
damage award to the actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff; and 3) the
comparison between the punitive damage award and the civil or criminal
penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct. ' 232 Applying
these three criteria, the third district found no reprehensible conduct on behalf
of the cruise line; a ratio of 3626 to one with respect to the amount of punitive
damages awarded in comparison to the actual
233 harm inflicted; and that the
cruise line was not guilty of any misconduct.

225. Id. at 1190-91 (quoting Langmead v. Admiral Cruises, Inc., 610 So. 2d 565 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997)).
226. Id. at 1191.
227. Id.
228. Langmead, 696 So. 2d at 1191.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
232. Langmead,696 So. 2d at 1192.
233. Id. at 1193-94.
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In support of its determination that the cruise line was not guilty of
reprehensible conduct, the third district noted: 1) the cruise line provided
medical attention to the entertainer immediately upon learning of her injury; 2)
it referred the employee to a specialist within two days of her injury in order to
ensure that she received the best possible treatment; 3) it continued to pay her
for three days following her injury when she did not work; 4) it paid for her
hotel stay and food expenses for a week while she was treated by a specialist
ashore; 5) it flew her from Mexico to California for treatment; and 6) it paid all
medical bills submitted by doctors not retained by the entertainer's lawyer.23 4
Further, it found that consistent with its finding of no reprehensible conduct on
the part of the cruise line, the cruise line was not guilty of "callous,"
"recalcitrant," "arbitrary," or "capricious" conduct in failing to pay the
entertainer for maintenance and cure and thus, was not liable for punitive
damages.2 5
Deciding in favor of the cruise line, the third district held that the award
of punitive damages was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
Additionally, the court held that the award was "so grossly excessive as to
shock the judicial conscience;" it bore no relationship to the entertainer's harm
and the cruise line's culpability; and it violated the cruise line's rights 37to
substantive due process under the United States and Florida Constitutions.2
Accordingly, it remanded the case with instructions
238 to grant the cruise line's
motion for directed verdict as to punitive damages.
In Kloster Cruise Ltd. v. De Sousa,2 39 the trial judge awarded the plaintiff
attorneys' fees following a plaintiff's verdict in an admiralty case seeking an
award for maintenance and cure, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees and
2 40
The post-trial judgment was based on the jury's finding that the
costs.
'willfully and arbitrarily' failed to provide maintenance and
defendant
2 41
cure.)
The defendant appealed and the Third District Court of Appeal held that
the recovery of attorneys' fees in a suit for willful failure to pay maintenance
and cure is nonseverable from the cause of action.242 Additionally, the third
district held that absent waiver of the parties, the jury is to determine not only

234. Id. at 1192-93.
235. Id.at 1194.
236. Id.
237. Langmead,696 So. 2d at 1194.
238. Id.
239. 677 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
240. Id.at 50.
241. Id.
242. Id.at 51.
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243
the plaintiff's entitlement to fees, but also the appropriate amount to award.
The third district found that in the instant case, the trial court, without
stipulation of the parties and notwithstanding defendant's objection, severed
244
the issue of the amount of fees to be awarded from the entitlement issue.
The third district reversed the trial court's judgment for attorneys' fees and
remanded for further proceedings. 245 Before concluding, the third district
suggested that should the trial court find it impractical to present the issue of
fee amount to a jury in the same sitting as other issues, it can have the jury
arrive at its verdict, and then receive evidence as to the amount of fees to be
awarded.24 6
In Kloster CruiseLtd. v. Segui,247 the plaintiff, while employed as a cabin
steward aboard a cruise line, was diag240sed with a degenerative hip condition
The plaintiff brought suit against the
requiring him to have his hip replaced.
employer cruise line for "negligence, unseaworthiness, failure to treat, and
failure to provide maintenance and cure., 249 He alleged that the cruise line
"failed to respond promptly and properly to [his] complaints of pain" causing
his medical condition to become aggravated and requiring hip replacement
instead of a "less intrusive" treatment.250 Four days before trial, the plaintiff
returned to the United States alleging that the surgery was negligently
performed in the Phillipines causing his right leg to measure "three-fourths of
an inch shorter than the left leg." 25 The cruise line moved for a continuance
of trial on the grounds "that it could not reasonably be expected to defend
against the newly discovered claim" of medical malpractice on such short
252
The trial court denied the cruise line's motion, and the case
notice.
proceeded to trial.253 The plaintiff prevailed, and the cruise line appealed.254
On appeal, the cruise line argued that the judgment should be reversed
based on the fact that the trial court wrongfully refused to grant its motion for
continuance. It further argued that in light of the recent decision by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Guevara v. Maritime Overseas

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Id.
DeSousa, 677 So. 2d at 51.
Id.
Id.
679 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kloster, 679 So. 2d at 11.
Id.
Id.
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Corp.,255 punitive damages are no longer available for willful failure to provide
a seaman maintenance and cure. 256 The third district reversed judgment on the
ground that the cruise line's motion to continue should have been granted.257
However, the third district ruled that binding precedent prevented the court
from ruling that punitive damages are no longer available for willful failure to
provide maintenance and cure.
B.

Coverage

In FloridaMarine Towing, Inc. v. UnitedNationalInsurance Co.,259 the
seller sold a tugboat to buyer/owner who made a down payment and was
obligated to pay the balance in installments over two years. 6 The seller was
considered a lender'and was added as an additional assured on the marine hull
insurance policy issued by the insurer. Although the policy contained a
navigational warranty, which confined the tugboat's use to inland waters in
Florida, the tugboat failed to restrict itself to Florida inland waters and sank in
the Atlantic Ocean. The insurer denied the seller's claim under the insurance
policy on the premise that the tugboat violated the navigational warranty. The
seller sued, arguing that "inland waters" includes anything within Florida's
three mile limit or, alternatively, that the seller lacked control over the
tugboat's navigation, and thus the seller could not be held attributable for the
navigational warranty's breach. The trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of the insurer, and the seller appealed. 261
The Third District Court of Appeal determined that since the contract at
issue was for marine insurance, federal maritime law governed the
interpretation of the navigational warranty. 262 Finding that the federal
maritime law requires strict construction of a navigational warranty, and that
such a warranty can release an insurer even if compliance with the warranty
would not
have avoided the loss, the third district focused on defining "inland
,2 63
waters.
Finding a plethora of United States Supreme Court cases defining "inland
waters," the third district determined that under the general maritime law,
"inland waters" is generally understood to mean waters on the landward side
255. 59 F.3d 1496 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 706 (1996).
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Kloster, 679 So. 2d at 12.
Id
Id
686 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id.at 712.
Id.
Id
Id.at 713.
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Since the tugboat sank
of the coastline, such as rivers, harbors, and canals.
in the Atlantic Ocean, seaward of the coastline, it was not in inland waters. As
district found that the seller breached the policy's navigational
third
such, the 26
5
warranty.

Despite the fact that the seller breached its navigational warranty, the
third district held that its lack of control over the tugboat's navigation
266
Additionally, the third
precluded the insurer from denying it coverage.
district held that since the seller was not merely a loss payee, but was an
additional assured, its coverage could not be adversely affected by the
In conclusion, the third district reversed the
mortgagor's wrongful acts.
268
summary judgment and remanded the cause for further proceedings.
VI. CONCLUSION

The summary of cases provided run wide in range with respect to issues
that may arise in admiralty and should give any novice a general
understanding of admiralty law.

FloridaMarine, 686 So. 2d at 714.
Id.
Id. at 714-15.
Id. at 715.
Id.
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